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ABSTRACT: Atocha Aliseda’s Abductive Reasoning (2006) gives a structural characterization of the “forward” explana-
tory reasoning from a theory to observational data. This paper asks whether there are any interesting struc-
tural rules for the “backward” abductive reasoning from observations to explanatory theories. Ignoring sta-
tistical cases, a partial explication of abduction is converse deductive explanation: h is abducible from e iff h 
deductively explains e. This relation of abducibility trivially satisfies Converse Entailment (if h entails e, then 
h is abducible from e ), but it does not generally satisfy Converse Consequence (if h is abducible from e and 
g entails h, then g is abducible from e ), since deductive explanation is not always transitive. 
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One of the important tools used in Atocha Aliseda’s Abductive Reasoning (2006) is the 
analysis of logical inference by means of structural rules. Such rules express formal 
properties of various kinds of reasoning by general principles of inference. Aliseda 
gives a powerful structural characterization of the “forward” explanatory reasoning 
from a theory to observational data. In this note, I ask whether there are any interest-
ing structural rules for the “backward” abductive reasoning from observations to ex-
planatory theories. 
Deductive Explanation 
Aliseda’s Chapter 3 gives a structural characterization of “consistent explanatory ab-
duction” Θ⎟ α ⇒ ϕ, defined by the conditions (i) Θ, α  ϕ, and (ii) Θ, α are consis-
tent. Here Θ is a theory, α an initial condition (the explanans), and ϕ the explanadum. 
In Chapter 5, Aliseda discusses Hempel’s DN-model of scientific explanation as a 
form of consistent explanatory abduction t⎟ c ⇒ e, where it is also required that (iii) 
not t  e, and (iv) not c  e. Deductive explanation differs from mere deduction , since 
it includes additional conditions which exclude trivial cases of inconsistencies, ad hoc 
explanation and self-explanation. Hence, the relation ⇒ fails to satisfy conditions of 
monotonicity and cut, which are typical of deduction , but restricted or modified 
forms of these principles may be valid. 
 Aliseda’s HD Monotonicity allows consistent strengthening of an explanatory the-
ory: 
t⎟ a ⇒ e t, b⎟ d ⇒ e t, b, a is consistent 
(1) 
t, b⎟ a ⇒ e   
The HD Cut principle 
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t⎟ a ⇒ b t⎟ b ⇒ e not a  e 
(2) 
t⎟ a ⇒ e   
states that explanation is almost transitive. Other valid principles include Disjunction 
of Theories 
t1⎟ c ⇒ e t2⎟ c ⇒ e 
(3) 
(t1 ∨ t2)⎟ c ⇒ e  
and Conjunction of two Explananda 
t⎟ c ⇒ e1 t⎟ c ⇒ e2
(4) 
t⎟ c ⇒ (e1 ∧ e2)  
But if explanation is required to be minimal (i.e., without irrelevant additional parts) or 
preferred (i.e., the best among rival explanations), such structural principles cannot be 
defended. 
 To simplify notation, let tEe mean that “t deductively explains e”, where the ex-
planans t may be a conjunction of theoretical assumptions and initial conditions. Con-
ditions (iii) and (iv) are special cases of Raimo Tuomela’s (1973) non-comparability 
requirement: in deductive explanation the explanandum should be logically independ-
ent of the ultimate truth-functional conjunctive components of the explanans. Let us 
denote this condition of non-comparability by inc(t, e). Let cons(t, e) mean that t ∧ e is 
consistent. Then deductive explanation can be defined by 
(E) tEe  =df  (t  e ) & cons(t ) & inc(t, e). 
Tuomela’s non-comparabity condition makes explanation irreflexive (cf. Aliseda, 
006, p. 138), so that even Aliseda’s Conditional Reflexivity (op. cit., p. 76) fails: 2 
(5)  Irreflexivity: not tEt. 
Irreflexivity entails that deductive explanation is asymmetric, since eEt and tEe would 
imply that e and t are logically equivalent: 
(6)  Asymmetry: If tEe, then not eEt.  
The principle (1) can now be rewritten in the form: 
(1’) Monotonicity: If tEe, inc((t ∧ b), e) and cons(t, b), then (t ∧ b)Ee 
This implies 
(7)  Conjunction of Explanantia: If t1Ee, t2Ee, and cons(t1, t2 ), then (t1 ∧ t2)Ee.  
Conditions (2)-(4) can now be rewritten: 
(2’) Transitivity: If uEt and tEe, and inc(u, e), then uEe 
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(3’) Disjunction: If t1Ee and t2Ee, then (t1 ∨ t2)Ee 
(4’) Conjunction of Explananda: If tEe1 and tEe2, then tE(e1 ∧ e2). 
Inducibility 
In my early work, I used a similar approach in the study of inductive reasoning, where 
the relation eIh means that “h is inducible from e” (either in the sense of inductive confir-
mation or inductive acceptance) (see Niiniluoto 1972; Niiniluoto and Tuomela 1973). Even 
though I had not yet heard about non-monotonic logic, I argued against the 
monotonicity and transitivity of induction: 
(8)      Monotonicity: If eIh, then (e ∧ b)Ih 
(9)  Transitivity: If eIh and hIg, then eIg. 
It was shown already in 1945 by Carl G. Hempel that no non-trivial notion of qualita-
tive confirmation can satisfy at the same time the principles 
(En) Entailment: If e  h, then eIh 
(CC)  Converse Consequence: If eIh and g  h, then eIg. 
(See Hempel, 1965.) Similarly, the following principles exclude each other: 
(CE) Converse Entailment: If h  e, then eIh 
(SC) Special Consequence: If eIh and h  g, then eIg. 
It is well-known that the high probability criterion of confirmation (eIh iff P(h/e) > q ≥ ½) 
satisfies Entailment En and Special Consequence SC. Howard Smokler (1968) sug-
gests that these conditions are characteristic to “enumerative” and “eliminative” rea-
soning. Aliseda’s proposal of combining inductive and deductive explanation, or “de-
ductive cut on the explanans” (op. cit., p. 145), and its justification by appeal to high 
probability, is an instance of SC. 
 On the other hand, the positive relevance criterion of confirmation (eIh iff 
P(h/e) > P(h)) satisfies Converse Entailment CE, but not conditions En, SC, and CC. 
Therefore, it does not completely fit Smokler’s idea that there is a form of “abductive 
inference” which satisfies CE and CC. Modifying an idea of Brody, it was suggested in 
Niiniluoto and Tuomela (1973) that one could replace the relation of deducibility  by 
the stronger relation of deductive explanation E in CE and CC: 
(CE*) If hEe, then eIh. 
(CC*) If eIh and gEh, then eIg. 
Then these two conditions might define Smokler’s “abductive inference”. Moreover, 
if En* and SC* are modified in the same way, then Hempel’s arguments do not any 
more count against combining En* and CC* or CE* and SC*. (For example, t & u 
does not explain t, and t does not explain t ∨ u.)  
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Abductive Inference 
Charles S. Peirce characterized abduction as an inference of a cause from its effect. Its 
conclusion is a hypothesis which is adopted “for the sake of explanation”. Peirce’s 
notion of explanation covers both deductive and inductive-statistical arguments (see 
Niiniluoto 1999). Thus, abductive or retroductive reasoning proceeds in a direction 
which is opposite to deductive or inductive explanatory arguments from causes to 
effects. Peirce’s best-known general formulation of abduction is the following: 
  The surprising fact C is observed. 
(A) But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. 
  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. 
(Cf. Aliseda, op. cit., p. 36.) In the weak sense discussed here, abduction is thus reasoning 
from a fact to one of its potential explanations. The stronger sense, where inference is to the 
minimal explanation or the best explanation of a fact, is beyond the scope on my re-
marks. It is assumed that the triggering fact for abduction is novelty, rather than 
anomaly, in Aliseda’s sense (op. cit., p. 47). I shall also ignore the reinterpretation of 
(A), where the conclusion states that theory A is truthlike (see Niiniluoto 2005). 
 Ignoring statistical cases, a simple partial explication of Peirce’s schema (A) would 
be converse deduction: 
(CD) eCDh  =df  h  e & not  e. 
This definition is known also as “deductive support” (Niiniluoto and Tuomela 1973, 
p. 221; Kuipers 2000). It has the virtue that it covers both cases of deductive explana-
tion and deductive prediction. It is a trivial consequence that CD satisfies CE. By the 
transitivity of deduction , it satisfies also CC. Hence, CD is a candidate for Smokler’s 
notion of “abductive inference”. 
 Another partial explication, which is more faithful to Peirce’s (A), is the definition 
of abduction as converse deductive explanation: h is abducible from e iff h deductively ex-
plains e. In other words,  
(A) eAh  =df  hEe. 
This definition has been proposed in Niiniluoto and Tuomela (1973), p. 227. Again, 
the relation A of abducibility trivially satisfies CE*: 
(10) If hEe, then eAh. 
Relation A does not generally satisfy CC*, since deductive explanation is not always 
transitive. But by (2’) we have a conditional transitivity property for A: 
(11) If eAh and hAu, and inc(u, e), then eAu. 
This rule implies a conditional converse consequence principle for A: 
(12) If eAh and uEh, and inc(u, e), then eAu. 
As E differs from , abducibility does not satisfy the original formulations of CE and 
CC. It is also clear that it does not satisfy E, E*, SC, or SC*. 
 Abductive inference is non-monotonic, since the following principle is not valid: 
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(13) If eAh, then (e ∧ b)Ah. 
Namely, if h explains e, then it is not always the case that h explains (e ∧ b), even when 
b is consistent with h. The latter task of explanation is clearly more demanding then 
the former. But by (4’) the following conjunction principle is valid: 
(14) If e1Ah and e2Ah, then (e1 ∧ e2)Ah. 
Another conjunction principle, which is not generally valid for inductive support I, is 
problematic: 
(15) If eAh1 and eAh2, then eA(h1 ∧ h2), 
since the conjunction of two rival explanations may be inconsistent. By (7) we have 
instead of (15): 
(16) If eAh1, eAh2, and cons(h1, h2), then eA(h1 ∧ h2). 
Further, principle (3’) implies that 
(17) If eAh1 and eAh2, then eA(h1 ∨ h2). 
 Most of the principles for A given here would fail, if the notion of abduction 
would also cover cases of converse inductive explanation. But this issue has to be left 
for another occasion. What we have done so far already illustrates the stimulus of 
Atocha Aliseda’s fine monograph. 
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